

178 In the new secularized and urbanized society, also, the position
 565 of the clergy became increasingly precarious. Like other insti-
 793 tutions of the Czardom the Russian Orthodox Church was organ-
 ized along the lines of sharp social differentiation and domi-
 nance-submission relationships. Russian Orthodox clergy as a
 whole formed a closed caste institution. All lay clergymen and
 many monastics were recruited from among the members of the
 [582] families of lay clergy. Endogamous marriage was practiced
 within this caste. The church maintained its own schools for
 both the sons and the daughters of clergymen. In this manner
 [184] the clergy had been separated from the rest of the society and
 had developed a sub-culture of its own. The clerics were set
 apart from others not only by their priestly garb, but by their
 manners, and even by their names.

792 Internally, however, within the ranks of the Orthodox clergy
 793 there was a sharp distinction between the monastic order (black
 • 554 clergy) and the secular priesthood (white clergy). The monastic
 order was rich in land donations and other possessions and all
 the Church hierarchy was recruited from among its ranks. The
 secular clergy was not only subordinate to the monastics, but
 also poor. Among the secular clergy sharp class distinction ex-
 isted between the city clergy and the village priests. This dif-
 ferentiation was manifested in the differences in income, educa-
 tion and prestige, as well as in the lack of intermarriage between
 these strata. The difference was also reflected in the attitudes of
 the laity. While the city clergy were socially accepted by the mid-
 [347] dle and lower urban layers, the village priests were rather iso-
 lated from the rest of the population.

However, the sharpest difference and social distance existed
 between the Church hierarchy and the rank-and-file clergymen.
 The heads of monasteries, for instance, behaved like real mag-
 nates. They took in large revenues, kept servants, horses and car-
 riages, and hardly shared in the life of their monastic brothers,
 even though these Church dignitaries resided in monasteries. In
 the same way, the bishops were inclined to belittle the lay clergy
 under their control. They treated them with a great want of re-
 spect. They would abuse them, insult them and then even flog
 them.

‡ [i.e. developing in the second half of the XIXth century -- Analyst]

REVOLT OF THE RAZNOCHINTSY INTELLIGENTSIA

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It was this contrast between the alleged lofty calling of the minister of a privileged Church and his sad fate that must have depressed many a priest and made him bitter and resentful. Even before he became priest, while still a student in the divinity school, where he was educated at the government's expense, he was exposed to abusive treatment at the hands of his superiors. He was ill-fed, insufficiently clothed, and frequently beaten with the rod or lash. At one time these Church seminaries were so unpopular that children of the clergy had to be forced into them with the help of the knut and of the police. Embittered because of bad treatment, many of these young men nursed a grudge against their disciplinarians, as well as against the Church, the state, and the society at large. The instructors in these institutions, ill-paid and badly treated by their own superiors, were often as wretched and as discontented as their pupils.² In this manner the conditions in these institutions tended to reinforce feelings of rebellion which were nursed in the family.

As a result of such circumstances, Russian-Orthodox seminaries became a fertile ground for revolutionary political propaganda which was spreading with an increasing intensity in all the middle schools and universities of the Czardom ever since the abortive uprising of the Decembrists.³ In this manner many Russian-Orthodox seminaries became hot-beds of subversive radicalism. Mutinies occurred and even attempts to assassinate rectors.

In the meantime, however, that is since 1869, services other than priesthood were opened to a priest's son. Since then the most rebellious youths from divinity schools and priestly families tended to leave church calling and engage in other activities. It was from among such rebels that many Russian revolutionaries were recruited. Chernyshevsky and Dobrolyubov among the "Nihilists," Nechaev among the Terrorists, Stalin among the Bolsheviks, are only a few outstanding examples in a long list of Russian professional conspirators and revolutionaries. Said Stalin:

In protest against the humiliating regime and the jesuitical methods that prevailed in the seminary, I was ready to become, and eventually did become, a revolutionary, a believer in Marxism . . .⁴

2 [i.e. in December, 1825 -- Analyst]

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THE IMPACT OF RUSSIAN CULTURE ON SOVIET COMMUNISM

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554 In a similar manner revolt was brewing in the bureaucracy and the armed forces. In a system which was founded on the principles of absolute dominance, subservience and unconditional submission, it is to be expected that the civil service employees as well as many officers would be often exposed to caprice, arbitrariness and wrong doings on the part of their superiors. These, too, were left without possibility of redress as were the clergymen. Strong sense of rank and social distance were as marked in these strata as among the clergy.

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565 The lay schools were not much different in strictness and discipline from the priests' seminaries, and students in these schools were often as ill-fed, ill-clothed, ill-housed, and as exposed to the rod and other degrading treatment. The student's parents, who were often impoverished gentry, petty chinovniks, or small traders with meager incomes and big families, were not always able to support their children throughout long years of schooling. At the same time in an economically and technologically undeveloped society with strong traditions of service nobility, there was nothing that young people from such families could do but to enroll at a university or a military academy in order to obtain government office, or to engage in free learned professions. In Russian society of those days these were the only possibilities of obtaining positions of some prestige. Many of these students from impoverished strata had therefore to depend upon public or private munificence to finish their studies. Some of them became police informers to secure a meager income and to finish schooling. Many had to drop out of school because of lack of financial resources.

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668 All Russian schools, therefore, on the middle as well as on the university level, became centers of revolt against an order which exposed them to humiliating treatment, but did not offer them opportunities in accordance with the established traditions of higher classes. Hence the higher the school, the more it was imbued with the revolutionary spirit. And the words "student" and "revolutionary" became synonymous.

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641 When new laws were introduced and these ambitious and rebellious young men and women finally entered state service they found that in addition to being ill-treated and ill-paid, a

2 [i.e. in the second half of the XIXth century. - Analyst]

517 upon the regime than the peasantry and industrial labor. The
 642 objective of this policy has been to prevent among the intelligentsia formation of an *esprit de corps* and opposition to Bolshevik rule, and to command the services and unquestionable obedience of every educated man. These are the political foundations of the growing and deliberately fostered stress on rank and distinction, on social differentiation, sense of superiority and inferiority, absolute superordination and blind subordination.

565 In the upper strata, much more so than in the lower classes,
 554 the process of hierarchal and functional differentiation is fostered and maintained not only by means of specialization of work and differences in rank, but also by means of sharply differentiated income, and by means of differential distribution of spoils, and of privileges. This sharp stratification of Soviet society, rooted in the traditions of the Czardom, in its own turn promotes power-seeking and domineering, dependency and subservience, as well as lack of social intimacy and lack of trust.

557 The highest privileges in the Soviet society are accruing to the top ruling faction of professional conspirators. But this group is itself internally sharply differentiated. It is headed by the Party Leader (*Vozhd*), and is divided into a number of policy making bodies, among which the Political Bureau (Politburo), now to be known as the Presidium,¹ is of foremost importance. Though the members of the Presidium and of other top policy making bodies, such as the Secretariat, are formally appointed by the Central Committee of the Party, they are *de facto* selected by the supreme leader and therefore depend upon him for their position. Such a situation fosters bickering among top ranking officials in their mutual struggle to win the favors of the head man, which in turn enables the supreme Party leader to play one faction of his camarilla against the other one or—not unlike in the days of the Czars—to select a more intimate inner circle of a few most trusted persons on whom to rely for advice and help. These then assist the leader in selecting and in eliminating the members of the top ranking hierarchy, according to expediency and circumstances.

This highly concentrated power structure is supported by a

INSTRUMENTS OF POLITICAL CONFORMITY

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corresponding Party structure on the lower levels of the Party hierarchy where Party Secretariats hold the reins of power. In this system of political and social control it is the Party Secretariats on local, regional and republic levels that are of pivotal importance.² Through his control of the Central Party Secretariat, the supreme Party leader is enabled to select the most useful and the most trusted people for such offices.³

The top Party leadership is therefore in a position to direct the recruitment of Party membership. It is empowered to accept and to expel members. It directs the secretariats on the lower levels of Party hierarchy as to whom the Party shall "elect" as its officers and as its deputies to the higher Party bodies, or whom to delegate to the local or national Soviets, and other representative Party or non-Party institutions. It consults with the secretariats about the appointment of trusted Party members to responsible regional and republic government and managerial positions, and it checks on fulfillment of Party directives. This checking is done through the Committee of Party Control whose representatives function independently of local Party bodies.⁴

Stalin was well aware of the significance of the selection of leading Party personnel from the point of view of perpetuation of power when he said "Cadres decide everything." It was by his control of the top Party Secretariat that he himself was enabled to eliminate all his opponents in the hierarchy and to rise to undisputed and absolute leadership.

Since it is local, regional and republic Party secretaries who form the axis of this monolithic Party-state machine, the position of such potentates yields great power, and high material rewards. Such offices are therefore sought after by people of great ambition and lust for power, also by people of fighting, conspiratorial and domineering inclinations. Thus it is the zealous, the shrewd, the calculating and the career-minded people who are also efficient and hard-driving that tend to be picked out for these positions because it is such people on whom the Party can rely for a blind and unquestioning execution of all orders. The Party which has remained essentially a conspiratorial organization demands militancy and aggressiveness, a severe and exacting attitude toward subordinates, irreconcilability and lack of com-

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665 Party members. Together with the policy-making Party bodies
647 they form the ruling class of the Soviet society. This top Party-state governing class consists perhaps of about two hundred thousand people or one tenth of one per cent of the total population. They are often referred to as the *Partia i Pravitelstvo*—the Party and the government.

[162] The middle and lower layers of government specialists are often referred to as the *Sluzhashchie*. This stratum includes the rank and file of the learned professions, the rank and file of the intelligentsia and semi-intelligentsia, the middle and lower professional military, the middle and lower government managerial ranks, the engineers and the technicians. According to the 1939 census the number of those in the *sluzhashchie* class, that is "all those who work in offices" was close to thirty million or seventeen per cent of the total Soviet population, as contrasted to the industrial labor (*rabochie*) which formed thirty-two per cent and the peasantry (*krestiane*) which formed forty-six per cent of the total.

• [554] The more one goes down this social scale, the smaller becomes the proportion of Party members to non members and of the privileged to the non-privileged. One's position in this caste-like pyramid determines his status expressed not only in the form of income, but even more so in the extent to which he gets the benefits of various social services, the extent of appurtenances,¹⁰ the amount of freedom of personal movement, and the degree of superordination and subordination.

665 The privileged position of the educated and semi-educated
565 classes is well manifested in the internal structure of the Bolshevik Party. As late as 1930 about 65 percent of Party members were workers or recruited from the working class, about 20 percent were peasants or of peasant background, and less than 15 percent belonged to the white collar class. But by 1941-42 the composition of the Party was reversed and apparently at present more than 70 percent of the new candidates and members are recruited from among the educated and official classes.¹¹ The Party rules, which in the first years of Bolshevik regime had favored the industrial proletariat, and to a certain extent the soldiers and the collective peasants, had to be revised in order to

CONTROL OF THOUGHT AND FEELING

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The wording of the Soviet armed forces oath bears witness to the vigor of this discipline and the strength of social pressure brought to its support. In addition to the punishment that may be expected by the Soviet soldier who did not fulfill his duty as expected, or who did not promptly sacrifice his life for the country is, according to this oath, "hatred and contempt of the working people" (*nenavist i prezrenie trudyashchikhsya*).⁸³ 703

At the same time the moral authority of the commander has been enhanced by a great amount of educational work and political agitation. The commander's unconditional authority is also consolidated with the help of an elaborate system of ranks, medals, and uniforms, and by the introduction of caste-like relations between the officers and the rank-and-file, a situation which is supported by the general trend in the Soviet society toward differentiation, superordination and subordination, and sharp social stratification. (554)

Accordingly, Soviet practices in military education and training favor different types of schools according to the rank and the class. In the school for commanders the admittance practices favor children of professional army officers. In this manner Soviet military schools tend to solidify the present military caste system and to develop professional classes of hereditary warriors. Following Czarist traditions there is much pomp, ritual and ceremonial in the armed forces. There is also a certain emphasis on mysticism manifested in kneeling, bowing of heads in silence and stress on holiness. All these are means of appealing to emotions, of emphasizing the sacredness of military duty, and of developing loyalty and dedication to the colors. 874 703

As a means of political control the armed forces of the Soviet Union are completely centralized and thoroughly infiltrated by Party men. The strength of Party control of the Soviet armed forces is best seen in the degree of Party infiltration of its commanding personnel. By 1934 the percentage of Party and Party-affiliated persons in the commanding positions of the Soviet Army was about 72. The percentages were even greater in the branches which are considered especially crucial from the point of view of security, such as the tank divisions and the air force. In these two branches the percentage of Party and Party-affiliated 701 665